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A QUESTION OF TRUST: FACEBOOK LIBRA AS MONEY 





This article examines the use of Facebook’s Libra (now renamed “Diem”) as a 
substitute for fiat money. It considers Libra’s prospects for success in light of the 
fact that it purports to substitute trust in a technology for the traditional legal 
supports that bolster public trust in traditional fiat currencies. The legal doctrines 
that support fiat currencies do so for the purposes of recognizing the economic 
functions that money performs and are also meant to support public policies that 
promote monetary stability, protect consumers and help to enforce anti money 
laundering statutes. It is argued that Libra will result in unintended challenges for 
monetary authorities that will subject the world’s financial system to greater 
consumer transaction risks, increase systemic risks, and make it more difficult to 
combat money laundering efforts. The ultimate question is whether the public can 
place its trust in Facebook and its partners to manage a global currency, or is that 
trust better placed in the hands of central banks?
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The troublesome question, What is money? has so 
constantly engaged the mind of economists that a 
lawyer might hesitate to join in the attempt to solve 
it.  Yet the true answer must, if possible be 
determined.  For ‘money answereth all things.’  It is 
a fundamental notion not only of the economic life 
of [hu]mankind but also of all departments of law.  In 
fact, a great deal of a lawyer’s daily work centers 
around the term ‘money’ itself and the many 
transactions or institutions based on that term, such 
as debt, damages, value, payment, price, capital, 
interest, tax, pecuniary legacy.  Money is a term so 
frequently used and of such importance that one is 
apt to overlook its inherent difficulties, and to forget 
that the multitude of its functions has led to a 
multitude of meanings.1   
 
F.A. Mann – The Legal Aspect of Money (1992) 
 
 These words, written by the eminent English Jurist Francis Mann at the 
beginning of his well-known treatise, nicely encapsulates the tension between 
economic conceptions of money, and their application to numerous legal doctrines 
that depend on a working legal definition of the same. Despite the fact that these 
words were written in 1992, current technological developments in consumer 
payment mechanisms (which Benjamin Geva defines as “any machinery 
facilitating the payment of money in the payment of a debt, which enables the 
debtor to avoid the transportation of money . . . to the creditor in the discharge of a 
debt”),2 have made these distinctions more relevant than ever. As such, it may be 
helpful to consider how legal definitions of money in the common law and 
elsewhere, may play a role in increasing (or undermining as the case may be) the 
public acceptability of new payment mechanism technologies that attempt to rely 
on technological proofs of trust rather than relying on the force of law to build 
public confidence in these new business concepts.   
 
 The past number of years have brought a number of aspirants to the 
payments world in the form of cryptocurrencies. The development of Distributed 
 
1 FREDERICK ALEXANDER MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 3 (5th ed. 1992).    
2 Benjamin Geva, The Concept of Payment Mechanism, 24 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 1, 4 (1986). 
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Ledger Technology has helped to overcome many of the initial issues that had 
plagued previous efforts to establish digital currencies, which can pose a serious 
challenge to state-issued fiat money.3 As these technologies have attempted to gain 
market share from established payment system providers, they have had to 
convince consumers that the benefits that flow from cryptocurrencies have 
outweighed any potential risks or justify any transactions costs to be incurred from 
substituting to cryptocurrencies from fiat currencies. 4  In doing so, they must 
persuade consumers that the technological advances that are present in 
cryptocurrencies can help to mitigate against risks incurred when dealing with 
private currencies generally.   
 
 As it happens, the development of Facebook’s recently announced Libra 
(now known as “Diem”) currency, is a unique opportunity to consider whether the 
development of a cryptocurrency using Distributed Ledgers, can also benefit from 
having the support of a large well capitalized multinational corporation with a built 
in userbase that numbers a staggering 2.7 billion individuals. 5  Hence, unlike 
traditional cryptocurrency offerings, Facebook is hoping that familiarity with its 
products and goodwill towards its platform will help to convince consumers 
throughout the world to begin transacting using Libra.6 The launch of this particular 
business model allows us to consider a number of questions including whether 
consumer goodwill towards an established promoter in combination with the 
leveraging of new payment technologies can help Libra to surmount some of the 
challenges that have thus far, hindered the acceptability of cryptocurrencies. 
Moreover, does the lack of any legal recognition really matter in the case of Libra 
(which hopes to fulfil some of the economic functions of money), if economic and 
technological realities dictate that the law ought to accept Libra as a form of cash? 
Finally, is there still a role to play for law vis-à-vis currency regulation or will 
technology replace the need for the rule of law to compel public acceptance of a 
currency? While it may be early at this stage to consider the prospects for Libra’s 
ultimate success or failure, there are a number of indicators present in the case of 
Libra which allow us to make an educated guess as to its long run prospects for 
 
3 See generally, Marco Iansiti, et. al., The Truth About Block Chain, HARV. BUS. REV. (January 
2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain. 
4 See generally, MUHAREM KIANIEFF, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW: OPPORTUNITIES 
AND RISKS (1st ed. 2019). 
5 Michael del Castillo, Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency: Under the Hood, FORBES (2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/06/18/facebook-cryptocurrency-under-the-
hood/?utm_source=TWITTER&utm_medium=social&utm_term=Valerie%2F#5a34586570e0. 
6  Paul Vigna, Facebook Says Libra Can Change the World. It Needs to Convince Users., THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-says-libra-can-change-
the-world-it-needs-to-convince-users-11561541402.  




success. In addition, one must also consider whether the development of a 
cryptocurrency such as Libra is a welcome development for consumers around the 
world, or does it subject them to unnecessary risks and dangers?  
 
 Part One of this essay will introduce Libra and discuss some of the features 
of the product that distinguish it from existing crypto currencies. Part Two will 
consider the economic functions that conventional money seeks to fulfill and briefly 
assess how Libra could conceivably fulfil these functions. Part Three will consider 
the long serving legal definition of money as reflected in the common law and 
statutes and situate Libra’s position within this rubric and consider how the 
economic functions of money may help to determine the legal status of Libra. Part 
Four will assess Libra from a consumer protection perspective with a view to 
considering how the proceeding three parts will demonstrate that the product is still 
a very risky proposition for consumers around the world. 
 
PART ONE: FACEBOOK LIBRA AS A NEW CRYPTO CURRENCY 
 
FOUNDING IN 2019 AND NOVEL FEATURES 
 
 When it was initially announced with much fanfare on June 18, 2019, 
Facebook’s Libra was promoted as a new digital currency that would help to change 
access to payment mechanisms for millions around the globe.7 The White paper 
that accompanied the release stated that Libra would help: 
 
• To provide services for the unbanked, and enhance financial inclusion; 
• eliminate costly fees associated with remittances, access to ATM, and 
overdraft charges;  
• reduce a dependency on payday lending; 
• provide for a global, open, and less costly system of moving money which 
is said to help stimulate global economic growth; 
• allow individuals to place their trust in a decentralized form of governance; 
and 
• support ‘ethical’ actors in the global payments system.8   
 
 
7 Colin Harper, Facebook’s Libra Is Here. But It May Not Be What You Think., BITCOIN 
MAGAZINE (June 18, 2019), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/facebooks-libra-is-here-but-it-
might-not-be-what-you-think. 
8 THE DIEM ASSOCIATION, WHITE PAPER § 2 (2020), https://www.diem.com/en-us/white-
paper/?noredirect=en-US [hereinafter “WHITE PAPER”]. 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12 
4 
 
 This is made possible, according to Facebook, by relying on decentralized 
networks to enhance acceptability and promote trust in the value that is represented 
by Libra.9 Echoing similar sentiments made by Satoshi Nakamoto when Bitcoin 
was launched, the trust represented by the auditable ledger that is publicly available 
and searchable is what allows crypto currencies based on Blockchains to avoid what 
is termed the double spend problem.10 Briefly, the double spend problem refers to 
the situation where an individual who comes into possession of a unit of crypto 
currency, cannot be sure that the value contained in this unit has not already been 
spent by a previous holder thereby rendering the unit worthless in the hands of the 
present holder (imagine being given a cheque made to bearer that has already been 
cashed for instance).11 Blockchains solve this problem by providing for a central 
repository that can be audited by anyone, who can then confirm that the value 
contained in the currency has not already been spent elsewhere.12 
 
 One of the features that sets Libra apart from other currencies that utilize a 
Blockchain approach is that Libra intends to use a hybrid private (permissioned) – 
public Blockchain.13 What this means is that on the public side, the software that is 
used to develop the currency is open sourced and theoretically open to anyone who 
wishes to develop it. 14  Facebook states that this will help to facilitate the 
development global interoperable financial networks that will help to assist 
individuals and businesses to transfer Libra around the world.15 
 
 The manner that Libra accomplishes this is by using a unique programming 
language, Move, that will implement custom transaction logic and smart contracts 
in order to make it easier for users to write code that “fulfils the author’s intent, 
thereby lessening the risk of unintended bugs or security incidents.”16 Facebook 
argues that this particular approach offers a couple of advantages. First, it provides 
an additional means of preventing double spending by constraining a digital asset 
to one owner, ensuring that it can only be spent once, and the creation of new 
 
9  Id. 
10 Russell Brandom, Facebook’s cryptocurrency Has a Trust Problem, THE VERGE (Jun. 18, 
2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/18/18683867/facebook-cryptocurrency-libra-calibra-
trust-banking; see also Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
11 See Kianieff, supra note 4, at 5-6.   
12 Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 2. 
13 Del Castillo, supra note 5. 
14 WHITE PAPER , supra note 8, at § 2. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at § 3. 




resources is restricted. 17  Second, the development of the Move language, also 
means that Libra can also verify that transactions only change the account balance 
of the sender and receiver, which is said to make transactions more secure.18 In the 
initial stages, transactions on Move-based smart contracts will be based upon pre-
defined templates, but Facebook has indicated that future versions will be user-
defined.19 This is important for the long-term viability of the product, not only as 
an payment mechanism, but as a financial platform that can support products and 
services developed by third party developers and businesses who wish to scale their 
products using the Libra platform.20 
 
 The hybrid nature of the Libra Blockchain also brings with it a number of 
variations from the model that Bitcoin first pioneered. For instance, the Blockchain 
that supports Libra does not rely on a conventional data structure found in other 
cryptocurrencies. 21  Rather, the Libra Blockchain relies on a virtual/logical 
construct that can be used by validators to confirm the system state rather than the 
conventional time-stamped batch transactions that are relied upon by permission-
less Blockchains.22  Facebook states that this allows transactions to be looked up in 
a more efficient manner, and the ledger itself is more easily updatable since anyone 
looking up a particular transaction no longer has to fetch and process all immediate 
preceding transactions.23 According to Facebook, the optimized nature of the ledger 
allows for more efficient operations since validators can store multiple versions of 
the ledger state and recompute the ledger state authenticator more efficiently 
following the processing of a transaction.24 
 
 Indeed, finding efficiencies in the handling of transaction data is key for 
Libra to outpace its rivals in providing transaction processing throughput that more 
closely approximates that of traditional payment mechanisms. For example, 
traditional payment mechanisms such as the credit card Visa, can process 
approximately 60,000 transactions per second, while conventional Blockchain-
 
17  Id. 
18  Id.   
19  See id. at § 1.   
20 Michael del Castillo, Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency: A Technical Breakdown for Business 
Leaders, FORBES  (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/06/18/facebook-cryptocurrency-under-the-
hood/?sh=656f292570e0 [hereinafter “Technical Breakdown”]. 
21 Jameson Lopp, Thoughts on Libra “Blockchain,” MEDIUM (June 18, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@lopp/thoughts-on-libra-blockchain-49b8f6c26372. 
22 Id.   
23 Zachary Amsden, et al., The Libra Blockchain, Libra, DEVELOPERS (July 23, 2019), 
https://developers.libra.org/docs/assets/papers/the-libra-blockchain.pdf.   
24 Id. at 15.   
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based cryptocurrencies are limited to approximately 7 per second.25 As a result, 
Facebook must add a comparable level of functionality, or at least something that 
more closely approximates the throughput of existing payment mechanisms if it is 
to offer consumers a compelling reason to switch. 
 
BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE RUBRIC 
 
 To this end, Libra has also made some changes to the governance structure 
and verification processes at the transaction level. Unlike Bitcoin which uses a 
proof of work consensus protocol, Libra will use a Byzantine Fault Tolerance 
consensus protocol.26 Briefly, the differences between the two are as follows: 
 
• Under a proof of work rubric, transactions that are proposed to be added to 
the Blockchain are verified by nodes on the network. These nodes compete 
with each other for the right to mint a Bitcoin as compensation for their 
services of verifying transactions against tampering in the data transmission 
process.27 The software that powers the Blockchain in question will decide 
which node on the network will have the right to seal off a block of 
transactions and begin the next one by randomly assigning a number of 
zeros to be added to the underlying hash of the transactions in question.28 
The first node that correctly guesses the answer seals the block and is given 
a reward in the form of Bitcoins mined by the system.29 This node then also 
receives the right to broadcast its batch of transactions to be updated on 
every other node’s copy of the Blockchain.30 
 
• Under a Byzantine Fault Tolerance Rubric, a node maintains an internal 
state that consists of ongoing specific information or status.31 When this 
node receives a message from the network, it will run a computation or 
operation in conjunction with its internal state in order to determine what 
course of action it should take.32 The Libra version of this protocol works 
by selecting a validator to serve as a leader in each round in which 
 
25 Kai Stinchcombe, Ten years in, nobody has come up with a use for blockchain, HACKERNOON 
(Dec. 22, 2017), https://hackernoon.com/ten-years-in-nobody-has-come-up-with-a-use-case-for-
blockchain-ee98c180100. 
26 Technical Breakdown, supra note 20.   
27 See Geva, supra note 2, at 12-17. 
28 Id. at 12-13.   
29 Id. at 13.   
30 See id at 12-17.  
31 See id. at 13.   
32 Id.   




transactions are processed.33 The leader will propose a block of transactions 
to extend a certified sequence of blocks that contain the full previous 
transaction sequence.34 When a validator receives a proposed block, it can 
then decide whether to vote in favor of its incorporation into the Libra 
Blockchain in accordance with its internal voting rules.35 Consensus for 
incorporation into the Blockchain is achieved once a contiguous three chain 
rule is satisfied (that is to say, at least three blocks of transactions 
incorporating the original transaction—the  original one plus two 
subsequent rounds of transactions—have been voted on in favor by ‘honest’ 
nodes that meet a requirement for quorum) before the state that results from 
executing these transactions is updated on the Libra Blockchain.36 
 
One of the reasons why Libra is relying on a Byzantine Fault Tolerance rubric is 
that it has found the protocol to exhibit high throughput and low transaction 
latency.37 It did not consider using the conventional proof of work rubric as a result 
of their relative inefficiency, high energy costs, and associated environmental 
costs. 38  It is estimated that the throughput of Libra at launch will support 




 It is important to note that the original composition of nodes and validators 
on the Libra network will be much more restricted in the initial stages than that 
found in permission-less cryptocurrency frameworks. The initial launch of Libra 
will be conducted using a group of geographically distributed ‘Founding Members’ 
who will assume initial responsibility for developing the ecosystem and investing 
resources to further its development. 40  Facebook asserts that this will help to 
maintain security in the system by having a safe and live validator set.41 These 
founding members will be selected from well-known organizations (who are 
presumed to act benevolently in order to preserve their reputations) in accordance 
with predefined eligibility criteria.42 Once the system is developed, it will transition 
 
33 Amsden et al., supra note 23, at 17.   
34 Id.   
35 Id.   
36 Id. at 17-18. 
37 Id. at 18.   
38 Id.   
39 See id. at 22; see also Jameson Lopp, Thoughts on “Libra Blockchain,” CYPHERPUNK 
COGITATIONS (June 18, 2019), https://blog.lopp.net/thoughts-on-libra--blockchain-/  
40 Amsden et al., supra note 23, at 2; see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at  § 5 (2020). 
41 Amsden et al., supra note 23 at 2; see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at § 6. 
42 WHITE PAPER,  supra note 8, § 6. 
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to a more broadly distributed public style model using a proof of stake consensus 
protocol.43 
 
 Until then, Facebook had initially managed to secure the participation of a 
number of well-known payment mechanism providers.  Among them were: 
 
• Credit Card companies such as Mastercard and Visa; 
• Payment Service Providers such as PayPal, Mercado Pago, Xapo and 
Coinbase; 
• Telecommunications companies such as Vodafone and Iliad; 
• Venture Capital Firms such as Andreessen Horowitz, USV, and Thrive 
Capital; 
• Non-Profit and Non-Governmental Organizations such as Women’s World 
Banking, Kiva and Mercy Corps.44   
 
With respect to the valuation of the currency, Facebook has announced a number 
of measures that are designed to mitigate against wild currency fluctuations of the 
type that has plagued previous cryptocurrencies. For one, Facebook promises that 
it will hold a number of “reserve assets” comprising of “low volatility assets such 
as bank deposits and short-term government securities from stable and reputable 
central banks.”45 Facebook notes that Libra is not a pegged currency and is still 
meant to fluctuate in value relative to the local currency it is exchanged against.46 
Nonetheless, Facebook claims that the asset pool, which is to be held by a 
“geographically distributed network of custodians with investment-grade rating” 
will assist in boosting consumer confidence and facilitate the decentralization of 
the assets held.47 What is not being promoted, of course, is a 100% reserve; but the 
function of the reserve is to act as a mitigating influence on any potential 





43 Amsden et al., supra note 23, at 2; see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at § 3.  
44 See Diem Association, Members, https://www.diem.com/en-
us/association/#goals_organization.  
45 WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at § 4; see also Michael Katz, Senate Holds Hearing on Digital 
Currencies, Blockchain, CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER (August 6, 2019), https://www.ai-
cio.com/news/senate-holds-hearing-digital-currencies-blockchain/. 
46 WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at § 4. 
47 Id.   




THE LIBRA ASSOCIATION48 
 
 In a similar vein, the governance structure that will oversee the management 
of these reserves is meant to reinforce consumer confidence by vesting control in a 
separate organization known as the Libra Association. Facebook states that the 
initial composition of the association will consist of representatives of the founding 
members.49 The implication here is that not only will the Association comprise of 
representatives of private enterprises but will also provide a voice for 
representatives from non-profit, multilateral and academic institutions from all over 
the world, to be headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.50 Facebook claims that this 
arrangement is meant to be analogous to the governance structure that is commonly 
found in foundations.51 The Association will be responsible for any policy changes 
and technical decisions that must be made, using a two-thirds voting majority.52 
 
 Interestingly, the Association is also charged with the task of maintaining 
the money supply function of Libra. That is to say, the Association is to decide 
when Libra coins are to be minted or destroyed as conditions warrant.53 Libra states 
that coins are to be minted when authorized resellers have purchased coins from the 
Association using fiat assets that are used to back to the coins.54 Conversely, coins 
are removed from circulation when the authorized resellers sell the coins back to 
the Association in exchange for the underlying asset.55 Moreover, the Association 
stands committed to repurchasing Libra coins at a price that is equal to the value of 
the basket of assets held by the Association.56 Facebook claims that this will result 
in the Association also serving as a “buyer of last resort” in accordance with a 
reserve management policy that can only be changed in accordance with a two-
thirds majority vote as described above.57 
 
 In sum, Facebook has promoted Libra as having a new level of 
interoperability that is not matched by existing cryptocurrency products. This is the 
result of the fact that Libra will have access to the Facebook platform, which it is 
 
48 As of December 1, 2020, the Libra Association became the Diem Association. At the time of 
writing, it was the Libra Association. For consistency, references in the body of the article are to 
the Libra Association. 
49 Id. at § 2. 
50 Id. at §§ 2, 7. 
51 Id. at § 7. 
52 Id.   
53 Id.  
54 Id.   
55 Id.   
56 Id.   
57 Id.   
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hoped, will significantly assist in customer acquisition. Facebook has also enlisted 
a number of organizations around the world to help demonstrate to customers that 
it is adopting the best practices in the industry in a manner in which it hopes will 
further efforts to be transparent to its customers. 
 
 Moreover, it is anticipated that by providing for the establishment of the 
Libra Association, the currency can be supported by a de facto private central bank 
that will help to shore up the value of Libra vis-à-vis established fiat currencies. As 
was noted above, the value of Libra will still fluctuate, however these tendencies 
will be mitigated by the Libra Association who will help to ensure convertibility 
and ensure that customers have access to money in the event that Libra falters. The 
value proposition here for consumers around the world is that Libra hopes to offer 
a more stable and less costly alternative to existing currencies, under the auspices 
of lowering transactions costs for all consumers, particularly those in developing 
economies where access to financial services remains a problem for many.58 
 
 At the core of this value proposition, is that consumers will ultimately have 
faith in, and trust, Facebook to establish and help manage a currency ecosystem 
that has a level of scalability that is presently unrivaled in the marketplace. Of 
course, much of this depends on the goodwill that consumers have in Facebook 
itself—a goodwill that has come under considerable strain in recent years (which 
will be discussed in greater detail below). Indeed, this may provide some insight 
into Facebook’s motivations for entering this space. Kevin Werbach argues that 
part of the rationale is that Facebook is hoping that the architecture of the 
Blockchain framework that underpins Libra will help it to re-establish trust between 
Facebook and its users.59 Certainly, time will tell if this is the case. Suffice it to say 
though that the reception that has greeted Libra is somewhat less than enthusiastic 
at the moment. 
 
 But, the broader question remains:  can the market position that Facebook 
occupies with billions of users around the world, plus the architecture of 
Blockchain, overcome previous efforts to establish private currencies that do not 
have the force of law or the power of the state behind them?  It is submitted that the 
answer to this question can be found by considering how the economic definition 
of money intersects with the common law legal definition and how the law/state 
plays a supporting role in maintaining public confidence in the medium of 
exchange.   
 
58 Id. § 1. 
59 Kevin Werbach, The Real Reason for Facebook’s New Cryptocurrency, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/opinion/facebook-libra-
cryptocurrency.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=&utm_campaign=. 




PART TWO: THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF MONEY AND THEIR 
MANIFESTATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COMMON LAW 
 
THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC VIEW 
 
 Essential to the function of any economy, is a universally accepted currency. 
And indeed, in any economy, currency performs a number of functions.60 The most 
famous of these was first articulated by the economist, William Stanley Jevons 
where he outlined the functions that currency serves in the economy. In short, they 
are that currency is a: 
 
1. Medium of Exchange:  Here money helps to alleviate the problem of a 
double coincidence of wants. That is to say, it is something that is valued 
by both parties to a transaction, which can be used in exchange for goods 
and services in the economy.61 The article that is selected then becomes 
money par excellence by custom or the force of circumstances;62   
 
2. Common Measure of Value: Being used to exchanging things frequently for 
sums of money, people begin to value other things in terms of money, so 
that all exchanges are calculated and adjusted by comparison to the money 
values of the things exchanged;63   
 
3. Standard of Value: Contracts for debts that require payment at some future 
date, will not require that the same commodity that was lent out be 
originally returned.64 For instance, if corn is to be exchanged on credit, one 
will not require repayment in corn plus interest. Rather, the creditor will 
prefer to have ‘money’ in the future rather than the thing that was originally 
lent out or purchased with the creditors loan. By stipulating that contracts 
be repaid in a particular denomination, current money serves the function 
of a standard of value by which the value of future payments is to be 
regulated.65   
 
 
60 See WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE 13-14 (1896). 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 14.   
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 14-15.   
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4. The use of money as a reference point in which prices are denominated is 
referred to as a “unit of account” and the future denomination of loans is 
sometimes referred to as a “standard of deferred payment;”66 and  
 
5. Store of Value: Individuals may wish to hold on to money in specie as an 
asset that maintains its value over time.67 
 
 The functions that money performs is also linked to the motives that 
individuals have for using it. The famous British Economist John Maynard Keyes 
classified these as follows:   
 
1. The Transactions Motive: Money is demanded for its use in making regular 
payments;68 
 
2. The Precautionary Motive: Money is demanded in order to be used for 
unforeseen contingencies;69 
 
3. The Speculative Motive: This arises from the uncertainties about the money 
value of other assets that an individual may hold.70   
 
These two concepts work hand in hand in establishing the conditions under which, 
a commodity can gain sufficient public acceptability in order to be considered 
money for economic purposes.  To quote from Geva and Geva:   
 
Like all systems of exchange, money can only be 
exchanged for other units of money, or exchanged 
for other goods and services, if there is social 
acceptance regarding its legitimacy. This legitimacy 
has multiple dimensions. It needs to be accepted as a 
store of value, and of equal importance, the exchange 
is made possible only if those engaging in the 
exchange agree that the goods and services are 
operating within the boundaries of what is socially 
permitted.71   
 
66 RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, et al., MACROECONOMICS 380-82 (McGraw-Hill Irwin 2011).   
67 Muharem Kianieff, Show Me The Money! A Critical Evaluation of Laissez-Faire Internet 
Currencies, 17 BANKING AND FINANCE L.  REV. 216, 221 (2001).     
68 DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 66, at 383.  
69 Id.   
70 Id.   
71 Benjamin Geva & Dorit Geva, Non-State Community Virtual Currencies, in DIGITAL 
CURRENCIES IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW  281, 289 (Sarah Green & David Fox eds., 2019). 





In a similar vein, Dornbusch et al., argue: 
 
Money is whatever is generally accepted in 
exchange. In the past an astounding variety of 
monies have been used: simple commodities such as 
seashells, then metals, pieces of paper representing 
claims on gold or silver, pieces of paper that are 
claims only on other pieces of paper, and then paper 
and electronic entries in banks’ accounts. However 
magnificently a piece of paper may be engraved, it is 
not money if it is not accepted in payment. And 
however unusual the material of which it is made, 
anything that is generally accepted in payment is 
money. There is thus an inherent circularity in the 
acceptance of money. Money is accepted in payment 
only because of the belief that it will later also be 
accepted in payment by others.72 
 
 As can be seen from the above statements,  for a medium of exchange to be 
commonly accepted as money, there must be a social acceptance of the currency as 
a valid tender in payment of debts, that can then be used by the holder, to pay others. 
That is to say, the acceptability of a medium of exchange depends in large part on 
the willingness of other members of society to accept it as satisfaction of a debt 
owing, or in exchange for goods and services.   
 
 What this means for Libra then, is that in order to evolve from being a 
payment system that helps individuals purchase goods and services from the 
Facebook platform, the Libra currency must find acceptability in a given 
geographic region (or ideally, globally) to serve as money outside of the established 
Facebook platform. Analogously, it has to go beyond being a mere token that helps 
to facilitate exchanges inside Facebook, to becoming a substitute for conventional 
current forms of money. Otherwise, Libra risks becoming a token that is limited in 






72 DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 66, at 382.    
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THE COMMON LAW VIEW OF CURRENCY AS MONEY 
 
 But, there is also a common law dimension that Libra must overcome. As 
Professor Geva  points out: “[c]urrency can be described as the transfer of money 
from hand to hand, in payment of debts, free from claims to it on the part of all 
persons, including prior owners or possessors.”73 And indeed, this concept of a 
transferable money that constitutes a unique exception to the normal rules of 
property law, in that even the true owner’s title can be extinguished in favor of a 
bona fide holder for value, is a concept that emerges from the initial cases in 
England that debated the nature of bank notes as a currency in and of themselves. 
For instance, in the 1825 case of Miller v. Race, Lord Mansfield stated as follows:   
 
These notes were designed to answer a deficiency of 
cash; and are of that use that not a tenth part of the 
trade of this kingdom could be carried on without 
them: They [have] become a medium of commerce.   
 
Questions, therefore, arising on these cash notes, are 
to be determined by the principle which governs in 
cases of trade; that is, by considering the usage of 
trade as part of the law.74   
 
Later on, his Lordship continues in a famous passage:   
 
It is neither goods, nor security for money, nor any 
document of a debt, but as much money as a guinea 
is, which appears by receipts given by bankers, on 
your paying bank notes into their hands:  their receipt 
is not for the specific bank-notes, but for so much 
money: which is so well understood, that they are 
commonly called paper money. Money, properly 
speaking, is whatever common consent has fixed 
upon as a sign denoting a certain value; and though, 
commonly, of gold and silver, yet, sometimes, of 
mixed metals:  and leather stamped has been used; so 
may paper; seeing, whatever the material is, common 
consent may make it money, to all intents and 
 
73 Benjamin Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History: On Commerce, Tyranny, and 
the Modern Law of Money, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 117 (1987).  
74 Miller v. Race (1825) 96 Eng. Rep. 1151, 1152. 




purposes; and that bank-notes are so received, and 
not considered as documents of a debt, or securities 
for money, appears from many determinations.75   
 
As Mann notes, by 1820, it came to be said that “the representation of money which 
is made transferable by delivery only, must be subject to the same rules as the 
money which it represents.”76 A similar holding was found in the United States case 
Newco Rand Co. v. Martin77 where the Supreme Court of Missouri stated:   
 
Money is currency, is not earmarked and passes from 
hand to hand.  There is no obligation on the part of 
the transferee to investigate a transferor’s title or 
source of acquisition of money when accepted 
honestly and in good faith.  One must give a bona 
fide transferee for value a better title than he himself 
has.78   
 
Therefore, precedent demonstrates that the concept of a bona fide holder for value 
from the law of negotiable instruments has been a central feature of helping to 
promote the circulatable aspect of money as applied to monetary instruments.79 
 
 In the context of Blockchain cryptocurrencies generally with their 
traceability/auditability that is built in to the technology infrastructure that support 
them, one cannot help but consider that the technology itself is helping to facilitate 
the transferability of a cryptocurrency as money, since the traceability aspect can 
be relied upon by a “holder” of the product, as proof that they are being conferred 
good title. What this means then, is that Blockchain technology itself is a means for 
not only allowing a currency to pass from hand to hand, but rather can also provide 
a sort of verifiable guarantee against the double spend problem which helps the 
product achieve the level of popular acceptability that it is crucial to have, if the 







75 Id. at 1154. 
76 CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 43, n. 185 (7th ed. 2012). 
77 Newco Land Co. v. Martin, 358 Mo. 99, 213 S.W.2d 504 (1948).  
78 Id. at 509. 
79 PROCTOR, supra note 76, at 43. 
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LIBRA AS MONEY 
 
 Despite the fact that Facebook has altered its view of Libra as a payment 
mechanism rather than a new form of money, one cannot help but notice that many 
of the economic indicia outlined above are very much present in their proposal.80 
For instance, Libra is clearly a medium of exchange, even if it is only meant to 
serve as a means of transferring money.81 The fact that “money” is being exchanged 
for Libra, which then forms the basis upon which transfers are to take place, means 
that Libra is taking the form of a currency in and of itself. In addition, the fact that 
exchanges are to take place through a Libra denomination makes it very clear that 
things can also be valued in terms of Libra. That of course, makes Libra a common 
measure of value and indeed, a standard of value as well.   
 
 Is Libra a store of value? The answer depends on some of the motives under 
which individuals may wish to hold a currency. As of this writing, there are 
conflicting statements from Facebook regarding potential motives that an 
individual may have for holding Libra. For example, in testimony before Congress, 
both the head of Libra, David Marcus and the head of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg 
both stressed that Libra is to be used strictly as a payment mechanism.82 But, as 
Marcus notes in his testimony, “Libra was established to be a digitally native 
currency that can be used around the world.  Libra brings together attributes of the 
world’s best currencies: Stability, low inflation, wide usability, and fungibility.”83 
The low inflation and stability aspects are important here for our purposes. Low 
inflation has been one of the major selling features of the development of 
cryptocurrencies since the appearance of Nakamoto’s white paper that gave rise to 
the concept in 2008.84 This is particularly the case in high inflation economies 
where the local currency may not necessarily be the best store of value. Any 
alternative that does not depreciate as rapidly and that has a relatively high 
acceptance rate immediately becomes attractive to consumers who are looking for 
 
80 See An Examination of Facebook and Its Impact on the Financial Services and Housing 
Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 116th Cong. 98-104 (2019) (statement 




82 Id.; Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, 
Investors, and the American Financial System, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 
116th Cong. 164- 170 (2019) (statement of David Marcus, Head of Libra). 
83 Marcus House Statement, supra note 82. 
84 Nakamoto, supra note 10 at 4; see also KIANIEFF, supra note 4, at 74-75. 
 
 




a stable medium where their savings can be denominated, and whose value remains 
steadfast in relation to the rapidly fluctuating local currency.   
 
 Hence, Marcus’ comments are particularly telling since the “stability” facet 
of Libra is meant to directly address not only the existing consumer concerns 
regarding potential fluctuations of cryptocurrency value, but also to individuals 
who live in high-inflation environments in search of a stable store of value. 
Moreover, this point is reinforced by the fact that Libra is structured as a “stable 
coin” that is backed by a basket of global currencies that presumably could be 
looked to in order to satisfy claims arising from financial difficulties that Calibra 
may find itself embroiled in that may make it difficult to exchange Libra for fiat 
currencies.85   
 
 As such, the fact that a stable store of what may be considered to be 
relatively “safe” investments that constitutes the basket of currencies used by Libra, 
may also serve to help reinforce public confidence that Libra has, as a fail-safe, a 
traditional asset base that underlies the currency. Moreover, it is also implied that a 
large company such as Facebook, in tandem with its partners, will provide a well-
capitalized base with which to commence operations. That is to say, it is represented 
to consumers that Libra is making prudent investment choices (rather than riskier 
ones with a higher payoff), and as such, the Libra Reserve (being an organization 
comprised of well-respected financial experts) that are designed to maintain the 
value of Libra. Notice as well, that the Libra Reserve is being represented as the 
relevant decision maker with respect to these investments, rather than Facebook 
itself, which is designed to add a certain amount of legitimacy that experienced 
entities are ensuring that Libra remains a consistent store of value.86   
 
 Indeed, Marcus himself touts this facet of Libra in outlining how it is 
proposed that Libra will differentiate itself from conventional stablecoins. To quote 
his House testimony:   
 
Unlike existing stablecoins – digital currencies 
designed to minimize volatility by being “pegged” to 
a single asset – Libra will not have a fixed value in 
any single real-world currency. Instead, Libra will be 
fully backed on a one-to-one basis through the Libra 
reserve, which will hold a basket of currencies in safe 
assets such as cash bank deposits and highly liquid, 
short-term government securities. These currencies 
 
85 See Marcus Statement, supra note 82.  
86 See id.  
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will include the U.S. dollar, the British pound, the 
euro, and the Japanese yen. This approach will 
minimize exposure to fluctuations from a single 
region, providing further stability for people around 
the world who could rely on Libra for their daily 
financial needs.   
 
The assets in the Libra Reserve will be held by a 
geographically distributed network of regulated 
custodians with investment-grade credit ratings to 
provide high auditability, as well as transparency, 
security and a decentralization of assets. These 
custodians are well-versed in safekeeping billions, 
even trillions of dollars’ worth of assets. Because 
Libra will be backed by the Reserve, anyone using 
Libra should have a high degree of confidence that 
they will be able to sell it for local fiat currency, 
based on an exchange rate, just like exchanging one 
currency for another when travelling.87   
 
 As can be seen above, this is in keeping with the fundamental premise that 
was laid out above, namely that people are being encouraged to rely on the expertise 
and reputation of Facebook, its partners, and their leveraging of new technologies 
to provide for new ways of granting access to individuals to payment mechanisms 
that no longer rely on traditional financial institutions. Conspicuously absent is any 
discussion of any role that government/law might play beyond that of a licensing 
authority who is asked to recognize Facebook and company as ordinary money 
transmitters / payment system providers rather than a conventional financial 
institution.88   
 
THE ROLE OF LAW IN BUILDING TRUST IN PAYMENT MECHANISMS 
 
 Here again, are some crucial features that are lacking, which may prove to 
be a very difficult hurdle for Libra to overcome. For instance, one of the defining 
 
87 Id. 
88 See, e.g., Examining Facebook’s Proposed Digital Currency and Data Privacy 
Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urb. 
Affairs, 116th Cong. 46-50 (2019) (statement of David Marcus, Head of Libra, 
Facebook). Marcus here is primarily concerned with complying with anti- money 
laundering and anti-terrorist financing regulations. He does concede that their will 
have to be prudential supervision of Libra, however this is to take place in 
Switzerland, where the company will be incorporated. 




features of state-backed fiat currencies is the fact that many of them are declared 
by statute to be legal tender.89 This has historically been the case since the Bank of 
England first began to issue its own bank notes that were designed to function as 
currency in 1844.90 In the United States, legal tender has been used to stabilize the 
financial system during times of panic and also to help facilitate the acceptance of 
federal reserve notes that were crucial to allowing the federal reserve to conduct 
monetary policy that was designed to contain the crisis.  To quote from Michael 
Barr:   
 
During panics, banks faced with a shortage of cash 
had no way to expand the money supply. Issuing 
more national banknotes to serve as an emergency 
currency was not an option because banknotes had to 
be backed by a corresponding value of Treasury 
bonds. Additional national banknotes could therefore 
only be issued through an increase in Treasury bonds 
deposited with the Comptroller of Currency. In times 
of panic, that was not an option because banks did 
not have enough money to purchase more Treasury 
bonds, let alone pay their depositors. In essence, 
national banknotes were not an elastic currency 
because their volume could not expand with rising 
need during a crisis. 
 
The Federal Reserve Act solved this problem by 
creating Federal Reserve notes, legal tender whose 
supply the Federal Reserve System could increase or 
decrease as needed. The Federal Reserve Banks were 
authorized to discount short-term commercial and 
agricultural paper for their member banks against the 
proceeds of which Federal Reserve notes could be 
issued and put in circulation. Then, as the discounted 
paper was paid off, the Federal Reserve notes would 
be withdrawn from circulation. In this way, the 
Federal Reserve could control the amount of Federal 
 
89 See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (making United States currency legal tender); see also Currency and 
Bank Notes Act of 1954, c. 12 UK, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/2-3/12 (allowing 
the Bank of England to issue bank notes). 
90 Bank Charter Act 1844, c. 32 UK, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/7-
8/32/enacted. 
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Reserve notes in circulation and, thus, the elasticity 
of the money supply.91 
 
Similarly, government intervention in the form of deposit insurance for instance,  
helps to encourage public confidence in our financial institutions. As Professor Barr 
et al., points out:   
 
Without deposit insurance, a banking crisis presents 
the same dilemma. Each depositor is presented with 
two choices. She can run to the bank to withdraw her 
money, knowing that it will undermine the bank’s 
soundness and have potentially disastrous 
consequences for the bank’s remaining depositors. 
Or, she can choose to leave her money in the bank 
and hope that other depositors will do the same, 
forestalling the need for the bank to liquidate its 
assets at depressed values, thereby preserving its 
soundness. Depositors understand that deposits are 
redeemed on a first-come, first-serve basis, known as 
a sequential service constraint. Depositors who 
choose to get to the bank first are more likely to be 
paid in full than those who make withdrawals later. 
In a world where depositors are not certain they will 
receive their money back on demand, making a run 
on the bank is an individually rational choice that 
leads to a collectively irrational outcome. 
 
A fundamental purpose of deposit insurance is to 
correct this misalignment between individual 
incentives and systemic effects. Under federal 
deposit insurance, which is administered by the 
FDIC, the government guarantees that depositors 
will be reimbursed for deposit losses caused by a 
bank’s failure up to a fixed amount. By placing the 
full faith and credit of the United States behind 
insured depositor balances, deposit insurance 
eliminates insured depositors’ incentives to run on 
the bank. Insurance eliminates the damaging 
collective action problem for insured depositors. The 
 
91 MICHAEL S. BARR, ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 47 (2018).  
 




problem of runs, however, still exists for large 
uninsured depositors and other uninsured short-term 
creditors.92 
 
In this sense, the legal regime that underpins a financial system, has helped to 
contribute to increasing public confidence in the state issued currency that is crucial 
for this currency to take the form of money, both in the economic, and the legal 
sense of the word. These features are presently lacking in Libra and it remains to 
be seen whether this absence will ultimately prove to be fatal.    
 
 One should not underestimate the power of law in fostering trust. As 
Professor Werbach correctly points out: 
 
How, then, does law promote trust?  In truth, trust 
and law have an ambiguous relationship. A promise 
lacking the required attributes of contract law may 
still be sufficient to engender trust, even though it is 
not enforceable. Conversely, untrusting enemies may 
enter into legally binding transactions if they see a 
mutual advantage. Yet the two domains are clearly 
connected. The question, which numerous scholars 
have engaged, is whether law is more likely to 
promote or undermine trust.   
 
On the one hand, law may enhance confidence and 
channel relationships in trust-enhancing ways. The 
legal system provides redress for violations of 
agreements, which may give the parties additional 
confidence when entering these relationships. This 
was essentially Thomas Hobbes’s argument in 
Leviathan. Legal enforcement is not perfect, but trust 
necessarily involves some risk. The legal 
enforcement mechanism may reduce the possibility 
and magnitude of loss from untrustworthiness 
enough to induce trust-based relationships. 
Moreover, law formalizes relationships. Knowing 
the scope of expectations on both sides, as well as 
placing the entire arrangement within a structure, can 
limit misunderstandings. Thus, even though legal 
 
92 Id. at 246. 
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enforcement rests on the Leviathan of state power, 
law may create necessary space for the informal 
arrangement of P2P trust. In the formulation . . . of 
trust as confident vulnerability, the prospect of legal 
redress makes the actor feel less vulnerable, thus 
expanding her or his confidence to interact . . . On 
the other hand, . . . Researchers have shown that if 
the trusting party is relying on the competence of the 
other, as opposed to its goodwill, reducing that 
competence to detailed contractual language can 
arouse suspicion. It suggests distrust, which may 
beget distrust in response.93   
 
As described above, Libra is facing a difficult challenge in balancing concerns that 
it can both operate a stable payments mechanism and ensure that this payment 
system and associated currency can withstand market pressures in order to function 
as money. The primary device that will help to facilitate this will ultimately be the 
trust that consumers place in Libra, and the technology that it will employ, to 
operate a safe and stable payment mechanism. But, the system that is proposed has 
yet to clarify how merely having a stable coin portfolio will help mitigate some of 
the risks outlined above, and how Facebook and their partners’ reputations are 
meant to compensate for the lack of having the force of law/regulation behind it in 
times of crisis. 
 
PART THREE: MONETARY POLICY RISKS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES 
ASSOCIATED WITH LIBRA 
 
LIBRA AND MONETARY POLICY 
 
 As mentioned above, one of the major advantages held by Libra, vis-à-vis 
its cryptocurrency predecessors, is the built-in userbase that will allow it to 
capitalize on synergies with the Facebook userbase. 94  This will also have 
tremendous repercussions on whether the Libra currency will attain a critical mass 
of circulation that will allow it to assume the economic and legal attributes of 
money. Writing twenty years ago in the context of electronic money, this author 
cautioned:   
 
93 KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 163-64 (Sandra 
Braman ed., 2018). 
94 Joseph Insirello, Politics and Geopolitics in Libra: an analysis, MEDIUM (Sep. 2, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@josephinsirello/politics-and-geopolitics-in-libra-an-analysis-part-1-
d90af328633c. 





Now suppose that in the long run, confidence in e-
money grows to a point where people begin to ask to 
be paid in e-money (usually the dominant form of e-
money in the marketplace) as opposed to traditional 
currencies to avoid the transactions costs associated 
with having to exchange the currencies. Individuals 
then make all of their purchases using the new e-
money, which for all intents and purposes is a perfect 
substitute for its paper equivalent. At this point, the 
e-money is disconnected from the standard that it is 
based upon, and as a result, paper money no longer 
figures into these individual calculations. It is at this 
point that the government has lost control over the 
money supply and the issuer now exercises the 
control and discretion that the central bank once 
did.95   
 
 Although Libra has not yet reached the level of scale required to displace 
conventional government-issued fiat currencies, the large userbase that it will be 
able to utilize through Facebook will give it a tremendous advantage in reaching a 
level of scale that its competitors will find very difficult to replicate.96 The built-in 
market recognition that Libra will gain by virtue of being an integral component of 
the Facebook platform, will allow Libra to pose a more direct threat to conventional 
fiat currencies than any other cryptocurrencies that have been launched to date.    
 
 This is not a threat that has been lost with various academic commentators 
in regard to the Libra proposal. Katherine Pistor correctly notes that the selection 
of a stable coin on its own does not guarantee that the Libra system will be immune 
from general market turbulence.97 In her testimony before the House Committee, 
Professor Pistor states that during a typical crisis scenario, investors will pay for 
the ability to keep their assets safe.98 What this means for Libra is that during such 
 
95 Show me the Money!, supra note 67, at 230. 
96 Taylor Telford, Why governments around the world are afraid of Libra, Facebook’s 
cryptocurrency, WASH. POST (Jul. 12, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/12/why-governments-around-world-are-
afraid-libra-facebooks-cryptocurrency/.   
97 Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, and 
the American Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Financial Services, 116th Cong. 
4 (2019) (statement of Katharina Pistor), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-
116-ba00-wstate-pistork-20190717.pdf.  
98 Id. 
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a crisis scenario, the global demand and supply for safe investments would 
influence Libra’s efforts to maintain its portfolio of stable currencies. Whether it 
would have enough market clout to help stabilize the value of Libra under such 
conditions remains to be seen.99   
 
 By virtue of the fact that it serves as a currency of currencies, the effect that 
this may have on foreign exchange markets may not be insignificant.100 Needless 
to say, this may help to frustrate some of the open market operations engaged in by 
central bankers by virtue of the sheer magnitude of the size of the potential Libra 
userbase. As Chris Brummer correctly notes, this will also be a challenge for 
customers of Libra who will also take on foreign exchange and currency risk due 
to the fact that Libra is a stable coin.101 To quote from Professor Brummer:   
 
In the case of a run, the key concern would be 
whether or not there are sufficient Libra currencies 
and government securities backing the Libra to 
support redemption requests. If there are not, and if 
the size of the Libra network was large enough – a 
run could conceivably have serious cross-border, and 
possibly systemic consequences. Holder of Libra 
could find themselves with “money” that has—
despite its assurances saturating the document—
significantly diluted purchasing power.102   
 
Robert Weissman, the President of Public Citizen takes the point further in his 
comments by noting:   
 
As the world has seen repeatedly, including but not 
only with the Southeast Asian financial crash in the 
late 1990s, currency runs can be contagious and 
spread across borders, provoking global crises.   
 
Currency runs are already a hazard in the global 
economy. Libra threatens to make the problem far 
 
99 Id. at 5. 
100 Id. 
101 Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, and 
the American Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Financial Services, 116th Cong. 
4-5 (2019) (statement of Chris Brummer), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-
116-ba00-wstate-brummerc-20190717.pdf. 
102 Id. at 5-6.   




worse—more likely to occur, more frequent and at a 
bigger scale – to the extent it achieves its object of 
“frictionless” conversion into Libra and out into 
currencies different than the original currency of 
purchase. National governments may be able to 
forestall currency runs through imposition of capital 
controls, a policy device that the International 
Monetary Fund now recognizes can help defend 
currencies from catastrophic devaluation. But 
governmental capacity to impose capital controls 
will, at minimum, be severely hindered by Libra, 
given Facebook’s objective that conversion would be 
as simple as posting a social media message. 
Imposing capital controls would require completely 
shutting down Libra within a country, a very difficult 
undertaking once the system is established and 
becomes pervasive.103   
 
Hence, rather than being merely a payment mechanism that allows individuals to 
have access to the financial system, the more “money-like” the Libra currency 
becomes, the greater the chance that Libra will pose a threat to the global financial 
system.   
 
 The issue of Libra’s threat to global financial stability merits further 
discussion. For instance, the discussion assumes that Libra in its present form will 
not include offering services that one traditionally associates with modern day 
banking. That is to say, the discussion only looks at Libra as a payment system 
provider and fails to consider whether Libra, will at some point in the future, engage 
in the activities that financial institutions have previously found to be very lucrative. 
As Brunnermeier et al., have noted in a recent paper, the emergence of technology 
firms offering cryptocurrencies in the space that was previously the province of 
financial institutions, may result in the radical restructuring of the method of 
delivery for financial services. One passage is particularly salient for our purposes 
here:   
 
In many modern economies, payment services are 
offered as an extension of banks’ intermediation 
 
103 Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, Investors, and 
the American Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Financial Services, 116th Cong. 
11 (2019) (statement of Robert Weissman), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-
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activities. The motive for the creation of payment 
instruments is banks’ demand for funds. Banks are 
the point of contact for all users of the payment 
system. In many countries, banks’ dominance of 
financial activities extends even to the provision of 
insurance and asset management services. The 
financial system, and the way in which consumers 
store and exchange value, is organized around banks 
and credit . . . 
 
In a platform-based economy, this hierarchy could be 
overturned. Payments are at the center of any 
economic platform, and all other activities would 
organize themselves around the central payment 
functionality. Consumers’ point of contact would be 
with the entity that owned the platform rather than a 
bank. Financial services such as payment and 
insurance would be subordinated to payment 
services. In this new type of financial hierarchy, 
traditional financial institutions such as banks could 
be replaced by fintech subsidiaries of payment 
systems.104   
 
If Libra were to gain the level of public acceptance that would make it money in 
the traditional economic and legal sense, this acceptance would go beyond 
accepting Libra as a global currency/money and would also help provide Libra with 
a built in userbase with whom it could offer additional services. Consumers would 
already be pre-positioned to accept these additional financial services from 
Libra/Facebook, since they would already be accustomed to relying on them to 
facilitate payments within the Facebook ecosystem and beyond. Libra could allow 
Facebook to achieve a level that would allow it to very quickly begin performing 
some of the functions that existing financial institutions have found to be very 
lucrative over the years.   
 
LIBRA AS A FINANCIAL SERVICES PROVIDER 
 
 This would have very serious consequences for holders of Libra, which 
merits further discussion. Suppose that the Libra Association initially finds that its 
efforts to increase access to the global payments system have proven to be quite 
 
104 Markus K. Brunnermeier, et al., The Digitalization of Money, OPENSCHOLAR AT PRINCETON 15 
(Aug. 2019), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/markus/files/02c_digitalmoney.pdf. 




successful. But, not content with this goal, the Libra Association seeks to grant 
additional access to world financial networks in a bid to increase individual 
financial independence by providing access to credit. Even though Libra has said 
that it will maintain a one for one reserve, Libra could argue that this massive capital 
reserve should be used to benefit underprivileged individuals who have difficulty 
obtaining credit, particularly in the developing world where it can help to 
considerably overcome many of the systemic burdens that prevent individuals from 
rising out of poverty. Many global philanthropic and empowerment efforts do so 
by providing individuals (particularly by focusing on women which studies show 
can help benefit an entire society by increasing their participation in the financial 
system) who lack a credit history with access to microfinance initiatives, whose 
objective it is to help individuals establish a credit history and fund small scale 
enterprises that help alleviate poverty.105 This would, of course, be in keeping the 
goals that Facebook has set out for Libra in its White paper.106 To this end, Libra 
could attempt to find new “productive” and “socially beneficial” uses for this “idle 
capital” that it would no longer need as 100% reserves after it reaches the requisite 
level of global acceptance as money in order to meet consumer redemption 
requests, much in the same way banks did when they were issuing private 
banknotes.107     
 
 This result would go beyond the traditional functions exercised by one 
entity and may give rise to an entire financial industry that is associated with Libra. 
As Omarova and Steele correctly point out:   
 
Once launched, Libra will spawn an entire ecosystem 
of financial services and service providers – 
authorized Libra dealers, brokers, asset managers, 
custodians, exchanges, digital identity providers, 
verifiers and so on – whose identities and 
qualifications we cannot yet anticipate. These 
entities may be controlled by Facebook or by other 
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corporate members of Libra Association, operate 
across multiple financial and commercial markets 
and not be subject to appropriate supervision and 
oversight by financial regulators.   
 
For example, what additional financial products and 
“synergistic” financial services will authorized Libra 
dealers, or “resellers” offer? Libra-denominated 
loans? Leveraged investments in Libra coins or 
Libra-denominated assets? Derivative products 
referencing Libra? These lucrative activities would 
immediately expand the reach of Libra far beyond 
simple peer-to-peer payments or remittances into 
every corner of the financial market.108   
 
This would prove to be a challenge not only from a domestic perspective of which 
agency/agencies are best equipped to regulate the ecosystem, but also from an 
international perspective, as well as the digital nature of the product which makes 
direct supervision difficult.   
 
 The first result of this change would be that it would be very difficult for 
Libra to argue that it should be regulated as a money transmission business since it 
would now be providing financial services. This would mean that Libra would be 
subjected to prudential supervision in order to determine what type of risk exposure 
any extensions of credit it makes would be subject to, and whether that would affect 
the ability of the Libra Association to redeem or exchange Libra for fiat 
currencies.109 This would bring into greater focus the quality not only of the loans 
made by Libra, but the risk profile of the investments in securities and global fiat 
currencies that are backing Libra. In this sense, the conduct of the Libra Association 
would have great significance to the world economy, not only as a global financial 
institution, but as a currency provider as well. Indeed, one commentator has argued 
that this would make the Libra Association into a de facto central bank that would 
require not only domestic supervision in the United States and elsewhere but would 
also need to work with International Monetary authorities such as the IMF and 
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World Bank. 110  As Professor Pistor correctly notes, Libra could very quickly 
transition from “too small to care” to “too big to fail” in short order.111   
 
 This raises two sub issues:  how would a global effort to stop a potential run 
on Libra overcome political resistance over the use of public resources to support 
an entity with questionable trustworthiness? And second, will political 
considerations vis-à-vis Facebook, as the perceived “de facto entity” behind Libra 
(despite its claims of maintaining an arm’s length relationship with Libra), affect 
the value or solvency position of Libra? These issues are discussed below.   
 
SYSTEMIC RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH LIBRA 
 
 Beginning with the “too big to fail” issue, the argument presupposes that 
there is an ongoing systemic risk associated with Libra. In other words, Libra, as a 
non-bank actor, can contribute to counterparty risks that other financial service 
providers experience. To quote from Kress et al.:   
 
Systemic risk spreads through the counterparty 
channel when a firm defaults on its financial 
obligations to counterparties and saddles them with 
losses. Firms default on their obligations in many 
different circumstances, few of which threaten 
financial stability. However, a nonbank financial 
firm can generate systemic risk if it experiences a run 
in the midst of broader financial market instability. 
 
To be vulnerable to a run, a firm normally must fund 
itself with some form of short-term liabilities payable 
in cash. Examples include repo transactions, 
securities lending, and commercial paper. In many 
ways, these short-term debts resemble bank demand 
deposits, the classic liability implicated in runs. 
Other types of short-term liabilities, such as a firm’s 
escalating need to post cash collateral, can also 
trigger a run.   
 
In the normal scenario, a firm is subject to a run if it 
pairs such short-term liabilities with long-term 
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illiquid assets. Firms in this position may be required 
to dump their illiquid assets at fire-sale prices in 
order to raise enough cash to meet immediate 
demands by creditors.  Knowing this, creditors will 
rush to claim repayment before the firm’s cash 
reserves run out, in a classic case of the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Creditors’ uncertainty about the firm’s true 
financial health will exacerbate this stampede. 
Unless the firm’s asset sales generate enough cash to 
cover its obligations (which is unlikely) and absent a 
bailout, the firm will default.112 
 
 Applied to the Libra example, the default that could take place here depends 
upon Libra’s ability to meet its customers’ redemption requirements. This is more 
likely in the scenario in which Libra seeks to loan out its capital reserves in the 
manner described above.  It is also a factor (albeit a diminished one) in the 100% 
reserve scenario as well. In the reserve scenario, a sudden and unforeseen demand 
for redemption in another currency could create an insurmountable challenge for 
Libra. Robert Weissman illustrates such an example as follows:   
 
The main worry is a classic “run on the bank” 
scenario, i.e., what happens if the Libra Association 
is unable to deliver on the promise to exchange Libra 
for a real currency of the user’s choice. For example, 
if Europeans worried about the value of the euro 
decided en masse to purchase Libra and then 
demanded payment in dollars, it is entirely possible 
the Association would not be able to pay out. If the 
Libra Association decided in the future to change its 
one-to- one reserve policy, or decided to invest some 
portion of the reserves speculatively and suffered 
losses, it could find itself unable to pay out. Or, 
because of failures among Libra Association 
members, breaches or questions about the Libra 
technology, new regulatory impositions, a failure by 
a bank holding a significant portion of the reserve, 
unforeseen rumors or developments, there could be a 
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run on the Libra and demand for payment in real 
currency beyond the capacity of the reserve.113 
 
Here again, the cruciality of the trust factor should not be underestimated. Trust 
will enable Libra’s ability to gain acceptability in the marketplace and it will also 
come into play in a potential bailout scenario. For instance, following the 2008 
financial crisis, there was a lingering resentment among individuals who felt that  
using taxpayer funds to assist an industry that was perceived as no longer serving 
the middle class would, in essence, both reward firms engaging in reckless behavior 
with taxpayer money and allow wrongdoers to go unpunished.114 Indeed, Kress, 
McKay, and Schwarcz argue that one of the unintended consequences of the 2008 
bailout is that it  incentivized non-banks to “affirmatively become systemically 
significant.”115   
 
 It is submitted that any proposed bailout of Libra, if necessary, be dependent 
on the goodwill that a country’s citizenry has towards Facebook, in addition to 
overcoming any lingering geographical or regional considerations of using 
domestic taxpayer dollars to bail out a nominally Swiss entity. In other words, if an 
association with Facebook tarnished the goodwill towards Libra, it would hinder 
the necessary international political goodwill required to assemble a bailout 
package, or to coordinate activities through the International Monetary Fund or 
World Bank without subjecting Facebook and Libra to a massive list of 
preconditions that may prove difficult to enforce. If these efforts stymied over a 
considerable amount of time, it may be too late to stop a run on Libra in time, or, 
at the very least, it would compound the problem. 116  Analogously, if trust in 
Facebook were badly damaged, it would make it very difficult for any bailout to 
proceed, particularly if there is a lack of consensus over whether Facebook intends 
to change its behavior.117   
 
 
113 Weissman, supra note 103, at 7.   
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 Some may argue that such a scenario is unlikely to occur. But the recent 
history of Facebook makes it very difficult to overcome the entrenched suspicion 
regarding its promises to the public. For example, the infamous example of the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal where Facebook was seen as a conduit for foreign 
misinformation campaigns during the 2016 Presidential Election.118  Despite its 
claims that it will not engage in malevolent behavior following this scandal, 
Facebook has again been recently implicated in a scheme involving a breach  of its 
users’ trust by  leveraging  users’ personal information  against potential 
competitors by giving firms Facebook had ongoing relationships with access to 
their users’ data and analytics, while withholding the same from partners who 
Facebook saw as a potential threat.119 The disclosed emails from Facebook’s top 
executives reveal a rather insincere attempt to use a concern over protecting 
consumer privacy as a pretext for attempting to harm potential rivals.120   
 
 Facebook’s potential malfeasance also plays a role in the second issue 
outlined above. Even if Libra were a prudently managed cryptocurrency that invests 
very conservatively, its association (real or perceived) with Facebook could trigger 
a run on Libra. For instance, should another scandal on the scale of Cambridge 
Analytica take place in the future, the negative goodwill that would be attributed to 
Facebook could affect the value of Libra and potentially trigger a run, despite the 
fact that Libra may have a relatively healthy balance sheet. One should not forget 
that this is also a feature that affects fiat currencies where domestic or international 
political developments and policy decisions can adversely affect a country’s 
currency.121 Consequently, even if one were to take Libra at its word that it will 
maintain an arm’s length relationship with Facebook over time, this may still be 
ineffective at thwarting a potential run. If there were an event that would massively 
shake public confidence in Facebook, this lack of trust could then become an issue 
for Libra by virtue of its perceived association with Facebook, particularly if 
individuals choose to divest their holdings of Libra en masse to protest Facebook’s 
actions.   
 
 Libra supporters could argue that this is precisely why the Libra Reserve 
will work to peg the Libra to fiat currencies in order to guard against any wild 
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fluctuations that may affect the value of the currency. This is typically why “stable 
coins” attempt to hold reserves of fiat currencies in much the same way that gold 
was used to back traditional currencies. In this sense, the premise behind stable 
coins is that they can ground currencies in actual assets that are valuable in and of 
themselves. This has two direct advantages. First, there is a reserve that can build 
public trust that any fiat currencies that they exchange for cryptocurrencies will be 
redeemed at par.122 Second, they are designed to ensure that the money supply that 
is regulated by the basket of assets is grounded in the assets themselves, thereby 
ensuring that there is no “artificial” growth in the size of the money supply.123 
Hence, Libra Association proposed to use a “currency board” approach to providing 
stability to the value of Libra rather than actively setting monetary policy.124   
 
 However, as Barry Eichengreen argues, the analogy comparing stablecoins 
with the gold standard omits the very active role that governments played in 
maintaining stable exchange rates. 125   Professor Eichengreen raises some very 
interesting points here that merit further consideration.  Stablecoins are not a 
passive system that simply relies on automatic adjustments of currency holdings in 
order to maintain the value of an official currency, but rather, they on a full range 
of tools to achieve its objectives, in addition to its open market operations.126 One 
of these is the fact that a central bank has legal support from the state in the form 
of legal tender laws which have served as a powerful tool in maintaining fiat 
currencies’ viability and acceptability during times of economic crises.127  It is 
submitted that this legal tender, which helps to mandate the acceptability of 
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governmental debt obligations, is crucial to building public confidence in fiat 
currencies and this is something that Libra, at the moment, finds itself sorely 
lacking in its bid to gain public trust.128 This trust is essential in making a currency 
money in and of itself, and without the legal support necessary to weather a crisis, 
Libra could find itself facing considerable difficulty in maintaining public trust 
without any assistance from governments who can use the power of law to compel 
their use.   
 
 An issue can also be raised with respect to how a successful Libra will result 
in considerable market concentration for the Libra Association/Facebook.  In recent 
years, Facebook has faced considerable criticism for using its market power to steer 
customers into its ecosystem, and the announcement of Libra has renewed concerns 
that Libra could give Facebook even more concentrated market power.129   
 
 Indeed, this potential for more concentrated market power will have 
significant consequences for monetary authorities. For one, there is a danger that 
any potential changes in the basket of currencies that will constitute the Libra 
Reserve, could be used to coerce or use undue influence over national governments 
to pursue policies that Facebook may find more favorable to its interests.130 This 
will serve as yet another factor in adversely affecting the exchange rate of a 
sovereign currency of an economy that is under pressure, potentially exacerbating 
an already challenging position. Moreover, the fluctuations present in the value of 
Libra may also have an unintended spillover effect as the exchange rates for any 
sovereign currencies that constitute a portion of the Libra Reserve would be 
perceived as fluctuations in the value of the sovereign currencies.131   
 
 Omarova and Steele note that the introduction of a private currency on such 
a wide scale as is predicted for Libra, will inevitably result in the Libra Association 
playing the role of a Central Bank.   
 
The potential injection of significant amounts of 
privately issued money into the financial system, 
without regard to the real economy or its productive 
capacity, would also have significant consequences 
for United States monetary policy and sovereignty. 
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Despite its claims to the contrary, the Libra 
Association would be effectively conducting 
monetary policy, both when it determines the 
composition of the basket of sovereign currencies to 
which the value of Libra is pegged, and when it acts 
as the “buyer of last resort” for [the] purposes of 
maintaining the stable value and supply of Libra 
coins. Unlike the Federal Reserve, however, the 
Libra Association would exercise these core central 
bank powers without the legally mandated public 
responsibilities and oversight framework of the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913.132   
 
In a similar fashion, Robert Weissman argues:   
 
[I]f large amounts of money remain within the Libra 
ecosystem without being paid back out in national 
currency, the members of the Libra Association will 
have a  self-interest in creating new fiat currency—
and distributing it to themselves. Their collective 
interest would incentivize them to keep Libra 
functioning, yes, but if they could allocate billions of 
Libra to themselves, why wouldn’t we expect them 
to do so? As Kaushik Basu, former World Bank chief 
economist, notes, Facebook and the Libra 
Association will “be tempted to issue extra Libra to 
earn seigniorage in the same way central banks do on 
the national currencies they issue.” At scale, this 
could potentially be inflationary on a global scale. 
Perhaps more troubling is how it would wrest control 
of monetary policy from central banks and nation 
states, who would have to set national monetary 
policy against the backdrop of Libra’s global 
monetary policy. It’s hard even to conceptualize the 
complications this would create, let alone figure out 
how they might be managed.133   
 
 For his part, David Marcus has publicly stated that the Libra Association 
has no desire at the present to compete with sovereign currencies or engaging in 
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activities that are associated with monetary policy.134 Moreover, Marcus assures 
regulators that Libra will work with the Federal Reserve and other central banks to 
ensure that Libra does not compete with sovereign currencies or interfere in the 
execution of monetary policy.135 But one cannot discount the possibility that even 
though Libra may not set out to influence monetary policy directly, it may end up 
doing so despite its best intentions. As was noted above, the sheer magnitude of the 
market presence of Libra will make its presence felt in global currency markets. 
Rather than mitigating these affects over time, an increasing market share for Libra 
will only amplify them.   
 
 Further, one could also argue that since the Libra Association will be 
incorporated as a not-for-profit entity, some of the temptations to manipulate the 
currency as described by Weissman above may not necessarily come to pass. As 
Professor Pistor points out, the Libra Reserve will be established as a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (as either a trust or a corporation) under Swiss Law, while the 
Libra Association will be comprised of members of an association known in Swiss 
Law as a “Verein.”136 What this means is that the Libra Reserve will be shielded 
from any legal liabilities that may be incurred by the Libra Association, while at 
the same time, the Libra Association will not be able to look to any of the assets 
held in the Libra Reserve in order to meet its own liabilities.137 The question then 
remains, how is the Libra Association to be funded and/or profits distributed to 
Association members? Professor Pistor is quite right when she states that the Libra 
Association will still maintain the power to allocate returns on the assets that are 
held in the Libra Reserve, and the White Paper states that these returns will be used 
to cover the costs of the system, including the operational costs, executive 
compensation, and crucially, dividends for Libra token holders.138 As noted by 
Professor Brummer, the White Paper fails to make clear whether members of the 
Libra Association are required to act as fiduciaries of the system, or whether they 
are able to put their own financial interests first.139   
 
 The issue of returns on investment makes Weissman’s comments in regard 
to seigniorage above, particularly prescient as this may also have a significant 
impact on monetary policy and consumer welfare. 140  At its most basic level, 
seigniorage is defined in the economic sense as the revenue that is associated with 
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the production of money and its maintenance.141 Analogously, it has also been 
defined as the difference between the value of money in exchange and its cost of 
production.142 The amounts earned by the government by producing fiat currencies 
is the result of having what is in effect, an interest free loan from the holders of its 
currency, which is the economic equivalent of the government earning interest on 
the cash that it issues.143 When viewed alongside some of the interest earned by the 
Federal Reserve on some of its other assets, the sums involved can be quite 
significant. In 2017, the operations of the United States Federal Reserve resulted in 
a transfer of $80.2 Billion to the United States Treasury.144 This is no insignificant 
sum and would certainly result in a serious economic impact should these earnings 
be transferred to a private entity such as Libra and away from national governments. 
This is a loss that would ultimately be borne by citizens of these countries in the 
form of government service reductions or higher taxes in order to replace the lost 
income that would now accrue to the benefit of Libra.   
 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER REQUIREMENTS 
 
 One of the areas where Libra has not provided many details relates to the 
know your customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering requirements that are in 
place in most major economies. These are requirements that all financial 
institutions must adhere to in order assist in the fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing. 145  Briefly, this requires a financial institution to verify the 
identity of a potential account holder before opening an account, and to monitor 
this account and report any suspicious activity.146  The time that is required to 
complete this due diligence, results in a delay before a customer gains access to 
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their accounts and services.147 The costs of complying with existing KYC/AML 
requirements are significant for existing financial institutions in developed 
countries.148 In 2017, a survey by Thomson Reuters found that financial institutions 
in the United States spent $48 million on average in labor costs and outsourcing 
associated with KYC due diligence.149 With larger financial institutions, this cost 
was estimated to be as high as $500 million annually.150 In a 2018 survey, Thomson 
Reuters found that financial institutions continued to add personnel to work on 
meeting regulatory KYC requirements, with existing personnel expecting to see 
significant increases to their workloads.151 Note that these amounts do not take into 
account the costs associated with failing to comply, which themselves can be quite 
significant.152 The increasing nature of KYC is therefore leading many to consider 
distributed ledger-based solutions, with their interoperability and immutability 
aspects, to help streamline the process.153   
 
 The problem becomes particularly compounded in the developing world 
where official documentation may be lacking, and where the compliance costs 
could outweigh the economic value of the account relationship for the financial 
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institution.154 As a result, efforts to reach the unbanked by providing microfinance 
loans that help individuals establish a credit rating are frustrated.155 Hence, any 
technological advancements that Libra can provide may prove to be quite helpful 
in fulfilling its mission to provide financial services to the unbanked around the 
world. This is why many organizations around the world have embraced Libra as a 
partner in fulfilling their own missions to do the same.156 The question still remains 
as to how Libra intends to achieve this, and whether it intends to establish 
partnerships with existing financial institutions to perform KYC due diligence.157   
 
 For many of Libra’s non-profit members, the development of the 
technology behind Libra can help overcome some of the regulatory hurdles that 
make reaching the unbanked more difficult. A Libra official recently stated that  the 
technology can allow for a tiered KYC which can require different levels of due 
diligence and authentication of personal data at different levels of financial 
thresholds. 158  Libra claims this is possible as a result of distributed ledgers 
providing a tamper-resistant means of real-time risk reporting, rather than utilizing 
the present self-reporting model dependent on competitive banks.159   
 
 A number of questions still remain unanswered in the White Paper. As 
Professor Brummer points out, there are a number of system-wide limitations from 
a design perspective with respect to monitoring Libra participants, that may result 
in Libra being used for illicit activity. To quote Professor Brummer:   
 
First, the on and off ramps into the Libra system 
– especially exchanges and wallets – could operate 
or establish themselves in jurisdictions with lax 
AML and KYC rules, surveillance and 
enforcement of local market participants. 
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According to the blueprint sketched out in the White 
Paper, it appears customers could conceivably trade 
Libra for privacy coins and vice versa abroad, hold 
Libra in wallets located in an unregulated 
jurisdiction, and then send Libra coins to Calibra 
wallet users.   
 
These challenges are complicated further by the fact 
that the Libra blockchain will allow clients to 
“hold one or more addresses that are not linked 
to their real world identity.” Besides helping to 
enable illegal transactions, this may not square with 
the surveillance and reporting responsibilities of 
Calibra as a money services business under the Bank 
Secrecy Act. By its terms, the Bank Secrecy Act’s 
“travel rule” requires covered financial 
institutions (and Calibra would be one) to pass on 
certain customer information [to] financial 
institutions receiving funds from their accounts, 
including the name and address of the 
transmittor.160  
 
 Professor Brummer continues:   
 
For anti-money laundering, as well as consumer 
protection and cybersecurity, the strength of the 
Libra ecosystem will lie in its weakest link.  In 
order to make claims that Libra is safe, relies on 
a “secure, scalable, and reliable blockchain” and 
will be regulatorily compliant, a well-considered, 
unified compliance program will be necessary. 
Otherwise, users of Libra coins could well find 
themselves answering questions by law 
enforcement officials in the wake of what they 
thought were ordinary Libra purchases. The 
White Paper fails to disclose this fact, much less how 
the product it is introducing would address it.  And it 
is, in my view, particularly important at this early 
stage of the blockchain’s development since once 
 
160 Brummer Statement, supra note 101, at 10 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).   




bad actors are in the system, purging their abuse may 
be especially difficult, if not impossible.161   
 
 
These observations raise important issues regarding consumer trust in Libra. If 
Libra cannot provide a frictionless experience for consumers that is not seen as a 
conduit for illicit activity, then it will find itself difficult to scale. Moreover, 
additional concerns remain about Libra’s ability to fulfill its mission to empower 
the unbanked, if it cannot answer the basic questions required by KYC, including 
identity, which may not be possible to verify physically.162   
 
 Indeed, as Professor Brummer states, the actions of Libra in this case 
depend on the actions of its partners in the Libra ecosystem.163 Here again, trust 
plays a prominent role in ensuring that the system can function smoothly—both 
trust that Facebook/Libra can place in their partners to ensure that they meet their 
commitments, and trust that consumers must place in Libra that it has screened and 
vetted its partners to ensure that it meets consumer expectations. But this represents 
a best-case scenario of sorts for consumers, since it assumes that Facebook and 
Libra will act in good faith and in a hands-off manner in operating the Libra system 
as a benevolent currency/payment mechanism. Consumers must take a leap of faith 
in assuming that Facebook/Libra will not leverage the seigniorage, transaction fees, 
and most importantly, the data generated by Libra in order to consolidate 
Facebook’s position as a social media and service provider giant.   
 
RECENT EVENTS THAT HAVE UNDERMINED TRUST IN FACEBOOK 
 
 With recent history as a guide, there is little reason to assume that Facebook, 
and by extension, Libra, will now change its behavior in a bid to re-establish trust 
with consumers in the manner described by Professor Werbach above. Consider for 
instance the misrepresentations that Facebook has recently made to consumers in 
recent years for which it has been required to engage in a consent agreement with 
the Federal Trade Commission.164 Amongst the activities that the FTC included as 
a basis for its complaint are the facts that Facebook:   
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• Changed its website in December 2009 to display publicly the information 
that users may have designated as private, and did not warn consumers that 
it was making the change, nor did it obtain their consent in advance;165 
 
• represented that third-party apps that were installed on users’ Facebook 
profiles would have access only to the information necessary to operate, 
when these apps actually had access to nearly all of users’ personal data;166 
 
• told users that they could restrict the availability of their data to a select 
group of friends when in fact this information was not shielded from the 
applications that their friends had installed;167 
 
• represented that it had a “Verified Apps” program whereby it certified the 
security of participating apps when, in fact, Facebook never did so;168   
 
• promised it would not give users’ personal information to advertisers—and 
subsequently broke this promise;169 
 
• claimed that a users’ photos and videos would not be accessible when they 
deleted their account. This was shown not to be the case;170 and  
 
• maintained that it’s data transfers between the United States and European 
Union complied with  the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Framework. Facebook was 
found to be in violation of this agreement.171   
 
 As a part of the consent order, Facebook was required to comply with 
certain conditions.172 As Robert Weissman points out, these commitments were 
famously violated when Facebook allowed Cambridge Analytica to exploit the 
private data of 50 million users in an attempt to influence voting in the 2016 
Presidential Election.173 Since then, Facebook’s reputation has continued to be 
tarnished amid accusations that it: 
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• Has failed to secure user passwords;174  
 
• has paid teenagers to download spyware;175 
 
• was accused by the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs of helping to facilitate the ongoing Rohingya 
genocide in Myanmar;176 and  
 
• was accused of failing to halt the exchange of child sexual abuse images 
through Facebook Messenger in a New York Times investigation.177   
 
 In light of these aforementioned instances, it would be reasonable to state 
that Facebook has a long way to go in its attempt to rehabilitate its image. And 
indeed, this will take some time, assuming that Facebook ceases engaging in this 
type of deplorable behavior—which it has yet to do. What this means for Libra is 
that the connection with Facebook as the initial promoter of the product has 
hindered its acceptability as a payment mechanism, much less as a currency. The 
trouble for Libra is that it cannot really separate itself from Facebook, since it needs 
access to the Facebook platform in order to provide it with the scale and 
functionality that it needs to differentiate itself from current cryptocurrency 
offerings. Until these issues are resolved, it is highly unlikely that Libra will attain 
the level of trust that is necessary to become accepted as a currency in the legal and 
economic sense.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 In the months that have followed the initial announcement of its launch, 
regulators in the United States have reacted with skepticism. In today’s highly 
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charged political atmosphere, an opposition to Facebook’s planned launch is a rare 
instance of bipartisanship as both the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Senator Crapo and the Ranking Member, 
Senator Brown, both issued opening statements that condemned Facebook’s 
previous conduct, and questioned whether things had changed vis-à-vis Libra.178  
Similar statements were made by the Treasury Secretary who questioned whether 
Libra was even launch ready in light of the fact that it had serious regulatory 
concerns that needed to be addressed.179 The Treasury Secretary has since relented 
slightly stating that he does not oppose a launch of Libra, but it would have to be 
fully compliant with all AML regulations before it would be allowed to launch.180 
A similar level of skepticism was also expressed by central banks around the world 
who vowed to block an unregulated Libra launch.181 For its part, Libra has publicly 
committed not to launch until U.S. regulators approve.182 The less than enthusiastic 
response of Congressional authorities, has prompted some of the initial Libra 
founders such as PayPal, Visa, Mastercard, eBay, Vodafone and others, to re-
evaluate their participation in the project.183 This exit was accelerated after Senators 
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Schatz and Brown sent public letters to some of these participants warning that any 
system failures on the part of Libra, could spill over and affect the participant’s own 
systems and financial well-being.184 Arguably, this is a considerable blow against 
the project if some of the partners with significant consumer goodwill have 
withdrawn from the project.   
 The calls for Libra to be subject to regulation, have only begun to stimulate 
discussions of some of the risks inherent with Libra, while ignoring some of the 
more prevalent ones that help to support a currency. For instance, much of the 
present talk has centered on AML regulations that are designed to thwart the use of 
Libra in order to commit illicit acts. There are still significant risks associated with 
Libra from a consumer protection perspective that heretofore, have not been 
addressed in calls for regulation. That is to say, there is no discussion of providing 
for prudential supervision of the Libra Reserve, nor is there any discussion of 
ensuring that all of Libra’s obligations will be redeemed in the event of a run. 
Without an independent third party, such as a governmental authority who can use 
the power of the state to stabilize a crisis situation, consumers will be forced to trust 
that Facebook and their partners will take the necessary steps to ensure that 
consumer expectations are met. As has been outlined above, these shortcomings 
can have catastrophic consequences for consumers in the event of a run, and this 
will significantly undermine confidence in the entire financial system.   
 Having seen the potential that Libra poses to supplant fiat currencies, 
regulators around the world have begun re-examining whether to issue a central 
bank digital currency before Libra reaches a sufficient scale so as to disrupt the 
ability of a central bank to conduct monetary policy.185 While these developments 
were previously taking place slowly, they have found a new sense of urgency the 
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accelerate research and development in this area. For its part, the Federal Reserve 
remains skeptical, citing the potential threats to its ability to set interest rates if it 
has to pay out interest on consumer balances that will be held at the Federal Reserve 
as part of this program, and the risks posed by hackers who could more easily steal 
currency from the Federal Reserve surreptitiously.186   
 In its submissions, Libra has warned that over-regulation or an outright 
hostility by U.S. regulators may end up hurting U.S. interests in advancing 
technology.187 David Marcus warns that if innovation is stifled in this area in the 
United States, then this technology will be developed abroad.188 With the greatest 
respect to Mr. Marcus, this, in and of itself, does not justify subjecting consumers 
to unnecessary risks that will jeopardize the long run viability of the entire financial 
system. Moreover, it is not necessarily true that there is a direct tradeoff between 
innovation and regulation. As the history of credit cards has shown, a strong legal 
regime that protects consumers can help to foster consumer trust that leads to 
greater acceptability of new innovations and allows these products to reach scale.189 
While nobody wants to stifle innovation, everyone wants these products to succeed, 
and in order to do so, steps have to be taken to provide for a legal regime or method 
of redress in the case of these types of too big to fail type products, so that they do 
not impose unnecessary costs and risk to consumers, and eventually governments 
who will have to fashion solutions in the event that these products find themselves 
in some difficulty.   
 The emergence of Libra has provoked a strong reaction throughout the 
world. Its development is an important one for helping to demonstrate how 
cryptocurrencies must find a means to back up their value in the event of a run, and 
how consumers will be reluctant to trust them until they find a way to do so. While 
initial developments in this area were focused on building trust in the technology’s 
ability to solve the double spend problem, which has largely been solved, the more 
pressing and challenging issue is how trust can be fostered among consumers in a 
manner that affects the product’s ability to carry out the economic and legal 
functions of money. This is not a problem that can be solved with technology alone. 
While it is admirable that Facebook/Libra has committed to working with 
regulators before the product launches, the discussion has thus far centered around 
AML regulations. These discussions need to encompass additional issues if Libra 
is serious about fostering trust. The questions facing consumers and regulators alike 
are whether they can separate Libra from Facebook and its previous conduct, and 
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whether, the requisite level of responsibility and accountability in the product is 
deficient in such a way that the public would be better served by a Central Bank 
Digital Currency.   
 Regulators would be wise to consider these issues expeditiously. As 
Professor Dornbusch once warned, “in economics, things take longer to happen 
then you think they will, and then they happen faster than you thought they 
could.”190 Any potential Libra launch must be tempered through prudent regulation 
in order to maintain public confidence in the financial system.  Of course, trust once 
lost, take a long time to regain. But, with the proper legal and regulatory regime, 
we can allow for innovation that maintains a legal of predictability and 
accountability that is so vital to maintaining public confidence. 
 
190 As cited in Mark Carney, The Growing Challenges for Monetary Policy in the current 
International Monetary and Financial System, Speech at the Bank of England (Aug. 23, 2019), full 
transcript available at  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2019/the-
growing-challenges-for-monetary-policy-speech-by-mark-
carney.pdf?la=en&hash=01A18270247C456901D4043F59D4B79F09B6BFBC.   
